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THE CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY
DOCTRINE: A HISTORICAL VIEW
WITH A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Chemical Dynamics, Inc. v. Newfeld
Corporations bestow enormous trust and power upon their officers and
directors. In return, the directors owe a fiduciary duty2 of utmost good faith to
their corporation and its shareholders.3 Common law has long implied a prom-
ise from an officer to give to the enterprise the benefit of his best care and
judgment and to exercise the discretion conferred to him solely in the corpora-
tion's interest; and not in his own personal interests." Fulfillment of this duty
requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation which is free of
conflict between the duty and the self-interest arising from human nature.'
Although officers and directors do not, in the technical sense, owe the higher
duty of trustee to the corporation,6 courts often have held that directors and
1. 728 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
2. In Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), the United States Supreme Court
addressed the high standards required of a fiduciary. It found that a fiduciary:
cannot serve himself first and his cestuis second. He cannot manipulate the
affairs of his corporation to their detriment and in disregard of the standards
of common decency and honesty .... He cannot by the use of the corporate
device avail himself of privileges normally permitted outsiders in a race of
creditors. He cannot utilize his inside information and his strategic position
for his own preferment .... He cannot use his power for his personal advan-
tage and to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors no matter how
absolute in terms that power may be and no matter how meticulous he is to
satisfy technical requirements. For that power is at all times subject to the
equitable limitation that it may not be exercised for the aggrandizement,
preference, or advantage of the judiciary to the exclusion or detriment of the
cestuis.
Id. at 311.
3. See, e.g., American Inv. Co. v. Lichtenstein, 134 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mo.
1955); Ramacciotti v. Joe Simpkins, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 425 (Mo. 1968); Johnson v.
Duensing, 351 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. 1961) (en bane); Merrill v. Davis, 359 Mo. 1191, 225
S.W.2d 763 (1950); Hyde Park Amusement Co. v. Mogler, 358 Mo. 336, 214 S.W.2d
541 (1948); Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble & White Lime Co., 334 Mo. 319, 66
S.W.2d 889 (1933).
4. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1272 (1986).
5. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939); Paulman v.
Kritzer, 74 Ill. App. 2d 284, 219 N.E.2d 541 (1966), affd, 38 Ill. 2d 101, 230 N.E.2d
262 (1967); see American Inv. Co. v. Lichtenstein, 134 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mo. 1955);
Merrill v. Davis, 359 Mo. 1191, 225 S.W.2d 763 (1950); Punch v. Hipolite Co., 340
Mo. 53, 100 S.W.2d 878 (1936).
6. Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 577, 218 S.W.2d 428, 431 (1949). While
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officers owe, in many respects, a "trustee-like" duty to the corporation and its
stockholders.'
The general fiduciary duty of directors and officers to the corporation
gives rise to the corporate opportunity doctrine. The doctrine is designed to
"prevent a corporation's fiduciaries from misappropriating business opportuni-
ties to which the corporation has a superior right."8 It is lucidly set forth in
the leading case of Guth v. Loft, Inc.': "[I]f there is presented to a corporate
officer or director a business opportunity which ... is one in which the corpo-
ration has an interest or a reasonable expectancy ... the law will not permit
him to seize [that] opportunity for himself."10
The rationale of the corporate opportunity doctrine reasons that, if any
possibility of personal profit is extinguished, a director will not be tempted to
breach the fiduciary duty owed his corporation.1" If a director or officer usurps
the corporation's business opportunity for personal gain, the usual remedy is
the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of the corporation upon
any property or profits acquired. 2 When applying the corporate opportunity
doctrine, however, it must be remembered that the doctrine is not intended to
dissuade corporate executives from making acquisitions which might be advan-
tageous to the corporation; rather, it acts only to prevent the director from
acquiring those opportunities which the corporation needs or is seeking.13
Chemical Dynamics
The Missouri case of Chemical Dynamics, Inc. v. Newfeld presented the
question of whether an officer of the plaintiff corporation usurped a corporate
opportunity by purchasing an option held on a building which the corporation
was renting.' 4 Chemical Dynamics, the plaintiff corporation, is a closely held
family corporation.' 5 Plaintiff A. Y. Schultz and defendants, Sol Schultz and
a director and managing officer of a corporation occupies the position of a fiduciary
toward the corporation, he is not strictly a trustee, and his "duties and liabilities are
not necessarily identical with those of other fiduciaries." Id.
7. See, e.g., Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 240 (1935) (holding that in
passing upon counterclaims against officers and directors in receivership proceedings,
the officers and directors are to be "dealt with as if they were technically trustees for
[the] creditors and stockholders").
8. Note, When Opportunity Knocks: An Analysis of the Brudney and Clark and
ALl Principles of Corporate Governance Proposals for Deciding Corporate Opportu-
nity Claims, 11 J. CORP. L. 255, 255 (1986).
9. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).
10. Id. at 272-73, 5 A.2d at 511.
11. Paulman v. Kritzer, 74 I11. App. 2d 284, 291, 219 N.E.2d 541, 544 (1966),
affid, 38 I11. 2d 101, 230 N.E.2d 262 (1967).
12. E.g., Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522
(1948); Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143, 53 A.2d 143 (1947).
13. Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897, 899 (2d Cir. 1967).
14. Chemical Dynamics, 728 S.W.2d at 592.
15. Id. at 591 (of 40 outstanding shares, 23 are held either by the Schultz family
2
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CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY
Lawrence Newfeld, were the managing officers and directors of the corpora-
tion. l8 In 1967 the corporation entered into a lease for a building for use as its
offices and manufacturing facilities."1 The lease contained a provision which
gave to the corporation an option to purchase the property for the sum of
$300,000 and to assume an existing deed of trust with an original face amount
of $250,000.18
By October 1970, the corporation was having financial difficulties and was
six to seven months behind with its rental payments. The owners of the prop-
erty sued for back rent and possession and received a judgement in their favor.
On November 20, 1970, the owners arrived at the corporate quarters to evict
the corporation.19 After negotiating with Sol Schultz, the owners agreed to
allow the corporation to remain in the building and to assign the lease with the
purchase option in return for payment of $21,492.38.20 The owners demanded
payment by 2:00 that same day, so Sol Schultz contacted several shareholders
about loaning the corporation the necessary funds. They all refused.21 Law-
rence Newfeld, one of the defendants, agreed to borrow money and lend it to
the corporation. 22 In return, Newfeld received a promissory note from the cor-
poration, a chattel mortgage on the corporation's equipment, and an assign-
ment of the lease with the purchase option from the original owners.23 Both A.
Y. Schultz and Sol Schultz signed the lease assignment as agents of the
corporation. 2 '
In February 1973 the owners notified Newfeld that they were willing to
sell the building for $336,000. In April 1973 Newfeld informed the owners of
his intention to exercise the original option for $300,000.25 Newfeld assumed
the first deed of trust in the amount of $213,793.13 from the owners.28 In
1975, after every creditor of the corporation had been paid in full, A. Y. Sch-
ultz demanded that the property be returned to the corporation.27 Sol and
Newfeld refused to return the building, and the corporation never acquired








22. Id. Newfeld signed a second mortgage on his home to secure the loan.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 592.
25. Id. In allowing Newfeld to purchase the building for the option price of
$300,000, the owners apparently extended the original purchase option.
26. Id. A portion of this was financed in the form of a loan from Harry Schultz
to Newfeld in the amount of $70,000. In return, Newfeld gave Schultz a. second deed
of trust on the property and a promissory note payable on demand.
27. Id. (he demanded this because "there was no longer any danger of the build-
ing being confiscated by creditors").
1988]
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title to the property, which had increased considerably in value.28
In 1976, A. Y. instituted a suit on behalf of the corporation. The trial
court found that the corporation "knowingly, willingly and voluntarily sold,
bargained, granted and transferred its entire interest in the lease, including
the option to purchase the real estate, to Newfeld as consideration for the loan
of November 20, 1970."29 For the court of appeals, "[t]he pivotal question is
whether.., the option to purchase the building constituted a corporate oppor-
tunity.""0 The court answered this question in the negative and upheld the
trial court's decision.31
THE CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE
In understanding the court's decision, a look at the development of the
corporate opportunity doctrine and the tests which have developed to imple-
ment that doctrine will be helpful. Initially, the traditional tests which courts
have used to determine whether a corporate opportunity exists will be focused
upon, along with the problems which have plagued and forced restructuring of
these tests. Then a proposed test whose goal is to alleviate the problems of the
traditional "court created" tests will be considered.
TRADITIONAL TESTS
Interest or Expectancy Test
"The interest or expectancy test is the oldest and most relaxed32 of the..
principal tests developed by the courts in determining the existence of a cor-
porate opportunity."33 The first application of the test was in Lagarde v. An-
niston Lime and Stone Co." In that case, the court maintained that a direc-
tor's self-dealing should be condemned only in those situations where property
is acquired in which the corporation "has an interest already existing, or in
which it has an expectancy growing out of an existing right, or to cases where
the officers' interference will in some degree balk the corporation in effecting
the purposes of its creation. '35 In Lagarde, the company owned one-third of
certain lands used in the quarrying of limestone. It had a contract to purchase
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 593.
31. Id. at 594.
32. Since an officer's self-dealing is only condemned in situations where the cor-
poration has an existing interest or an expectancy growing out of an existing right, an
officer is afforded great leeway in his private dealings. Therefore the threshold of liabil-
ity is higher than other corporate opportunity tests.
33. Comment, Tests of Corporate Opportunity, 8 CUMB. L. REV. 941, 944
(1978).
34. 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900).
35. Id. at 502, 28 So. at 201.
[Vol. 53
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one-half of the remaining two-thirds, and had been negotiating unsuccessfully
for the other one-half. Using knowledge acquired from their relationship with
the company, two of the directors convinced the owners of the outstanding
property to sell it to them on an individual basis. The court held that the land
which the company had a contract to purchase was acquired wrongfully in
violation of the corporate opportunity doctrine, but the land which was in the
midst of negotiation was not covered by the doctrine and therefore was ac-
quired legally.36 Simply stated, "corporate fiduciaries are precluded from tak-
ing on an individual basis opportunities in which the corporation has an inter-
est or expectancy",3 7 but "does not require of its officers that they steer from
their own to the corporation's benefit, enterprises, or investments, which,
though capable of profit to the corporation, have in no way become subjects of
their trust or duty."38
In later years, some courts adopted variations of Lagarde that tend to
make it easier to find an officer or director liable for usurping a corporate
opportunity. In Litwin v. Allen,"9 the court described situations in which an
interest or expectancy could be found under the then current law. These in-
clude, for example, "the fact that the directors had undertaken to negotiate in
the field on behalf of the corporation, or that the corporation was in need of
the particular business opportunity.. ., or that the opportunity was seized and
developed at the expense, and with the facilities of the corporation. '40 In sum-
marizing these examples, the question which determines if the corporate op-
portunity doctrine has been violated is whether the directors have profited at
the expense of their corporation; whether they have gained because of their
disloyalty to the corporation's interests and welfare.41
A further evolution of the interest or expectancy test is found in Abbott
Redmont Thinlite Corp. v. Redmont.42 The test here was whether the corpora-
tion had an interest or "tangible expectancy" in the disputed opportunity.43
"The likelihood of realization from the opportunity" was the key to whether
an interest or expectancy was in fact tangible and thus within the rule which
precludes an officer from violating a fiduciary duty to gain profit for himself.4
If it is likely45 that the corporation will in fact embrace the opportunity, then
36. Id.
37. Note, supra note 8, at 262.
38. Lagarde, 126 Ala. at 502, 28 So. at 201.
39. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
40. Id. at 686.
41. Id.
42. 475 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1973).
43. Id. at 88.
44. Id. at 89.
45. In using the word "likely," the court is retaining a great amount of control
over the test by keeping it within the realm of subjectivity. In essence, the court will be
making a factual determination based upon the particulars in every case, instead of a
legal determination based upon law. By using words such as "likely," courts are forced
to proceed in a case by case manner which keeps the law in a state of uncertainty.
19881
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the expectancy is said to be tangible and falls within the boundaries of the
corporate opportunity doctrine.
As is apparent, there has been a movement by the courts to increase of-
ficer's or director's potential liability by changing the meaning of the words
"interest or expectancy". By expanding the definition of those terms,40 the in-
terest or expectancy test is broadened to the point where it has become a mere
test of fairness.47 Thus, while many courts nominally follow the interest or
expectancy test,48 most have modified the test for the sake of fairness,'49 and in
so doing have changed it altogether.
Line of Business Test
The line of business test developed in response to the perceived harshness
of the Lagarde test. Succinctly stated, "when a corporate fiduciary is
presented with a business opportunity that falls within the corporation's line of
business, the corporation has a prior claim to that opportunity."50 An opportu-
nity is within the corporation's line of business whenever the opportunity is
closely related to the existing or potential activities of the corporation. 1 A
more definite explanation of what is the "line of the corporation's business"
can be found in Guth v. Loft, Inc..52 In Guth, Loft Inc. was engaged in the
sale of beverages. Guth, the vice president, was dissatisfied with the services of
the Coca-Cola company and decided to search for another supplier. He ac-
quired a Pepsi-Cola franchise to supply Loft, but did so in his own name. To
enhance this franchise, Guth used the assets of Loft without the knowledge or
acquiescence of the board of directors. In finding that Guth had violated the
corporate opportunity doctrine, the court developed the "line of business" test:
where a corporation is engaged in a certain business, and an opportunity is
presented to it embracing an activity as to which it has fundamental knowl-
edge, practical experience and ability to pursue, which, logically and natu-
46. Compare the standard for liability under Lagarde with the standard for lia-
bility under Litwin. Under Lagarde, "interest or expectancy" is limited to those oppor-
tunities which have become subject to a director's trust or duty, even though they are
capable of profit to the corporation. However, under Litwin, "interest or expectancy" is
expanded to whether the directors have profited at the expense of their corporation, or
gained because of their disloyalty to the corporation. See supra notes 33-41 and accom-
panying text.
47. Compare discussion of fairness test, infra notes 63-69.
48. E.g., Farber v. Servan Land Co., 541 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1976); Tovrea
Land & Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 100 Ariz. 107, 412 P.2d 47 (1966); Raines v.
Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 313 S.W.2d 802 (1958).
49. The courts are trying to protect the interest of the corporation and its stock-
holders from the "self interest" of the officers or directors. In this sense, the test be-
comes one of what is fair to the stockholders in comparison to what is fair to the
directors.
50. 11 J. CORP. L. 255, 257 (1986).
51. Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 224-25, 222 N.W.2d 71, 81 (1974).
52. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).
[Vol. 53
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CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY
rally, is adaptable to its business having regard for its financial position, and
is one that is consonant with its reasonable needs and aspirations for expan-
sion, it may be properly said that the opportunity is in the line of the corpora-
tion's business.5 3
Although this explanation of what is in the "line of business" may seem defi-
nite, courts have had problems applying it to specific facts." This uncertainty
has led many courts to seek a more simple definition. One court held that a
corporation's charter powers define the scope of its line of business. 5 Another
court held that the line of business is restricted to the corporation's existing
operations."8 The most recent court to discuss the issue seems to have com-
bined these views, stating that the trier of fact should be concerned with the
relationship of the opportunity to the corporation's purposes57 and present ac-
tivities.58 Finally, other courts ask whether the opportunity "was so closely
associated with the existing and prospective activities of the corporation that
the defendants should fairly59 have acquired that business for or made it avail-
able to the corporation."60 The courts are noticeably confused about what en-
compasses a corporation's "line of business,"61 and again it seems as if they
chose the safe harbor of "fairness" in determining the line of business of a
corporation.
Fairness Test
The fairness test grew out of a dislike for the alleged objectivity of previ-
ous corporate opportunity tests. In this test, objectivity is abandoned, and
courts "look only to the equitable considerations involved in the situation
presented. '62 The case which originated this proposition is Durfee v. Durfee
and Canning, Inc.63 Defendant in Durfree was an officer of two corporations,
53. Id. at 279, 5 A.2d at 514.
54. See, e.g., Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919 (1956).
55. Weismann v. Snyder, 338 Mass. 502, 505, 156 N.E.2d 21, 23 (1959).
56. Lancaster Loose Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Robinson, 199 Ky. 313, 317-18, 250
S.W. 997, 998-99 (1923).
57. A corporation's purposes would be stated in the corporate charter.
58. Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 81 (Minn. 1974).
59. It seems that the courts are again trying to establish a sense of fairness
within the line of business test. As can be seen throughout the text, all traditional
corporate opportunity tests eventually turn to "fairness" in establishing whether a cor-
porate opportunity has been usurped. This evolution is not to be criticized, only recog-
nized for the effect it has on the discussed tests.
60. Rosenblum v. Judson Eng'g Corp., 99 N.H. 267, 272, 109 A.2d 558, 563
(1954).
61. Cf. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939); Lancaster Loose
Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Robinson, 199 Ky. 313, 250 S.W. 997 (1923); Weismann v. Sny-
der, 338 Mass. 502, 156 N.E.2d 21 (1959); Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222
N.W.2d 71 (1974) (examples of various courts' formulations of what falls within a
corporation's line of business).
62. Comment, supra note 33, at 950.
63. 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948).
19881
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both dealing in natural gas. Without informing either corporation, Defendant
caused one to buy its gas supply from the other, to the Defendant's personal
gain. In determining that a corporate opportunity had been usurped, the court
rejected the interest or expectancy test and held that the
true basis of the governing doctrine [of corporate opportunity] rests funda-
mentally on the unfairness in the particular circumstances of a director,
whose relation to the corporation is fiduciary, "taking advantage of an oppor-
tunity ... when the interests of the corporation justly call for protection. This
calls for the application of ethical standards of what is fair and equitable...
[in] particular sets of facts.""4
Since there is a great amount of subjectivity involved, the "application of the
fairness test must always, of necessity, be a question for the trier of fact."' 9 In
application, Massachusetts is the only state which strictly follows the fairness
test.6 8 Jurisdictions which purport to follow this test usually combine it67 with
the line of business test,68 or with the interest or expectancy test.6 9
"Restricted" Line of Business Test
Another test, purporting to follow Guth, makes liability of a corporate
officer even more difficult to establish by adding a "five factor" test. In
Solimine v. Hollander,70 the court listed five conditions, the existence of any
one of which precludes officer liability. Under the "five factor" test, a business
opportunity does not belong to the corporation:
a) Wherever the fundamental fact of good faith is determined in favor of the
director or officer charged with usurping the corporate opportunity, or
(b) where the company is unable to avail itself of the opportunity, or
(c) where availing itself of the opportunity is not essential to the company's
business, or
(d) where the accused fiduciary does not exploit the opportunity by the em-
ployment of his company's resources, or
(e) where by embracing the opportunity personally the director or officer is
not brought into direct competition with his company and its business.71
As with many other tests of corporate opportunity, Solimine is just another
caveat to a preceding test72 looking for a clearer and more useful definition.
64. Id. at 199, 80 N.E.2d at 529 (quoting BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONs 204-
05 (1946)).
65. Comment, supra note 33, at 951.
66. See Production Mach. Co. v. Howe, 327 Mass. 372, 99 N.E.2d 32 (1951).
67. In essence, this "combining" of the fairness test with other tests is in applica-
tion only. The only case which specifically combined the fairness test in theory with
another test was Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974); see infra
notes 74-78.
68. Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974).
69. Abbott Redmont Thinlite Corp. v. Redmont, 475 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1973).
70. 128 N.J. Eq. 228, 16 A.2d 203 (1940).
71. Id. at 246-47, 16 A.2d at 215.
72. Solimine adheres to the decision set forth in Guth, yet adds five additional
400 [Vol. 53
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Although it achieved its goal of enhanced clarity, it does not adequately pro-
tect of the rights of corporations.7 3
Miller "Two Step" Test
The last of the traditional corporate opportunity tests is found in Miller v.
Miller.74 It is a two part test which, in essence, combines the line of business
test and the fairness test. 5 The first step is a flexible application of the line of
business test, the inquiry being:
whether, within or without its corporate powers, the opportunity embraces ar-
eas adaptable to its business and into which the corporation might easily, nat-
urally, or logically expand; the competitive nature of the opportunity-whether
prospectively harmful or unfair-; whether the corporation, by reason of insol-
vency or lack of resources, has the financial ability to acquire the opportunity;
and whether the opportunity includes activities as to which the corporation
has fundamental knowledge, practical experience, facilities, equipment, per-
sonnel, and the ability to pursue.7 8
If the opportunity is labelled "corporate", then the inquiry proceeds to the
second step, the fairness test. If the fiduciary did not violate his duties of loy-
alty, good faith and fair dealing toward the corporation, then there will be no
liability."7 Thus, the Miller test "establishes a middle of the road standard
that is more rigorous than the lax interest or expectancy test, but less demand-
ing than the subjective fairness test when used alternatively with the line of
business test.17 8
Proposed Test
The most recent corporate opportunity test is that supported by the
American Law Institute.7 9 This test requires an affirmative act on the part of
factors which could prevent liability. Id.
73. Because of the additional five factors, establishing that a corporate opportu-
nity has been usurped is very difficult. Therefore the rights of the corporation could be
infringed by the unlikelihood of finding that there was in fact a corporate opportunity.
74. 301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974).
75. Comment, supra note 33, at 952.
76. Miller, 301 Minn. at 225, 222 N.W.2d at 81.
77. Id. at 226-27, 222 N.W.2d at 81-82.
78. Comment, supra note 33, at 954.
79. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.05 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1986).
Section 5.05 states:
a) A director or senior executive may not take advantage of a corporate op-
portunity unless:
(1) he first offers the corporate opportunity to the corporation and makes dis-
closure concerning the conflict of interest and the facts concerning the corpo-
rate opportunity;
(2) the corporate opportunity is rejected by the corporation; and
(3) (A) the rejection of the opportunity is fair to the corporation; or
(B) the rejection is authorized, following such disclosure, by disinterested di-
1988]
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the corporate fiduciary before he may take advantage of a corporate opportu-
nity.80 In essence, if the director or officer wishes to pursue the opportunity for
his personal benefit, he must first present it to the corporation.8 1 After presen-
tation, the corporation is forced either to act upon the opportunity or to reject
it,8 2 opening the door for the director to pursue the matter on an individual
basis. These affirmative duties placed upon fiduciaries and corporations make
the ALI test the most useful and worthy test of those presented. In a simplistic
and straightforward fashion, this test sets the basis for what must be done
when a corporate opportunity is deemed to exist.83 In no uncertain terms a
fiduciary must present the opportunity to the corporation, and the corporation
must accept or reject the invitation. The certainty of these guidelines are what
the law has sought, and through their use, such certainty is produced.
ANALYSIS OF Chemical Dynamics
With these various tests set out, the question becomes what test the court
used in Chemical Dynamics, and how it compares with the American Law
Institute proposed test. Initially, the court's analysis leads to the belief that the
court used the line of business test8 4 as stated in Guth. The court pursued this
idea as a threshold barrier 85 and purported to use the test in concluding that
this was a situation in which the corporate opportunity doctrine was inapplica-
ble8' in that the opportunity was on an individual rather than on a corporate
level.
Although the court could feasibly determine that the facts of this case
rectors, in a manner that satisfies the standards of the business judgment rule;
or
(C) the rejection is authorized or ratified by disinterested shareholders, fol-
lowing such disclosure, and the shareholders' action is not equivalent to a
waste of corporate assets.
80. Id. § 5.05(a)(1).
81. Id.
82. Id. § 5.05 comment a, illustration 3 (1986) (rejection may be based upon
lack of interest of the corporation, its financial inability, legal restrictions placed on the
corporation, or unwillingness of a third party to deal with the corporation).
83. This is good because courts have waned on the more abstract tests because of
problems in applying them.
84. Supra notes 50-61.
85. Chemical Dynamics, 728 S.W.2d at 593. The court defined the corporate
opportunity doctrine as:
forbid[ding] a corporate director from acquiring for his own benefit an oppor-
tunity that would have been valuable and germane to the corporation's
business.
... This duty applies to an opportunity which is "in the line of the corpora-
tion's business and is of practical advantage to it, [or] is one in which the
corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy. .. ."
Id. (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 272-73, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (1939)). This
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warranted the use of the line of business test, the court instead adopted and
applied the fairness test,8 7 possibly without realizing what they had done.88
The court did not explicitly mention the fairness test in their opinion, but signs
of the test are abundant, with an array of statements sounding in equity. For
example, the court stated:
Newfeld was willing to invest his own funds to save a corporation which was
operating at a loss and which was unable to pay its creditors. [He] risked his
own money when other experienced businessmen had refused to do so. No
element of fraud appears anywhere in the entire transaction. . . . Further,
there is no evidence that, when Newfeld exercised the option in 1973, he ac-
ted surreptitiously or in bad faith. . . . Had [he] not funded the corporation
in 1970, there was a real danger that the corporation could not have contin-
ued and that, by 1973, the investment of every shareholder would have been
lost.88
These statements show that the court's analysis contained an application
of equitable standards, 0 which are the basis of the fairness test. 1 The court
chose to conclude that no corporate opportunity existed, but used the fairness
test instead of the line of business test in reaching that conclusion. Classifying
the test is merely a matter of manipulating labels for its analysis.92 Whether
the court deems its decision to be based on the "line of business" or "fairness"
87. Supra notes 63-69.
88. By not using the fairness test, but in using its equitable standards, the court
is implying that it is ignorant of the specific test, yet knowledgeable of its intended
purpose.
89. Chemical Dynamics, 728 S.W.2d at 593.
90. An important distinction can be made at this juncture concerning the focal
points of discussion usually accompanying the fairness and line of business tests. When
the fairness test is applied, the inquiry tends to focus on the individual actors. The
court seeks to determine whether the director or officer acted in a self-serving manner,
or whether the good of the corporation was in mind. But when the line of business test
is applied, the inquiry shifts to the business itself. The court only wishes to determine
what are the existing or potential activities of the corporation.
In the court's decision here, most of the analysis centered around the activities of
Lawrence Newfeld. His actions were discussed at length to determine if he acted in
bad faith or in the best interest of the corporation. Conversely, the court's discussion
concerning the activities of the business is scant at best. In fact, the court's treatment
of this issue is virtually non-existent. This helps to highlight the fact that, although the
court purports to follow the line of business test, its analysis and discussion was based
entirely on the equitable and individual factors constituting the fairness test.
91. Supra note 62.
92. The court might not have wanted to "explicitly" change the law of corporate
opportunity in Missouri. It is possible that the court felt more comfortable in making a
substantive change while retaining the "line of business" label. It is also possible that
the court is happy with the line of business test, yet felt that equitable standards were
more useful under the particular facts of this case. Therefore, instead of changing the
law, the court just "bent" it a little while looking for a certain outcome. A final possi-
bility could be that the court was modifying the line of business test, adding fairness to
the analysis. In this way, the court would be adopting an approach similar to that used
in Miller.
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test, the outcome is the same. Therefore, the court can continue to use its own
interpretation of the line of business test, or it can use the original fairness
test. In substance, there is no difference.
In comparison, the ALI test is a straightforward and less confusing test
than that applied by the court. The ALI test breaks down the inquiry into
three basic questions. The first question to be asked is whether the director or
senior executive "first offer[ed] the corporate opportunity to the corporation
and [made] disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the facts con-
cerning the corporate opportunity.19 3 Even with the time constraints,9 4 Sol
Schultze managed to offer and to disclose 6 the opportunity of loaning the
corporation the needed money in return for the option to purchase the building
to several shareholders. 97 Therefore, step one has been fulfilled. The next ques-
tion is whether the "corporate opportunity [was] rejected by the corpora-
tion."98 This is also answered affirmatively in that all of the shareholders who
were offered the opportunity refused to accept.99 The third requirement can be
satisfied by one of three questions, any one of which is determinative without
the other two.100 The third of the three is applicable in this case:101 whether
the "rejection [was] authorized or ratified by disinterested sharehold-
ers. .... ,1 Several shareholders of the corporation authorized rejection of
the offer,'10 3 whereby Newfeld, after such rejection, took the opportunity per-
93. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 79, § 5.05(a)(1).
94. Chemical Dynamics, 728 S.W.2d at 591 (the payment had to be made by
2:00 that same day).
95. Even though it was Sol Schultz instead of Lawrence Newfeld who in fact
offered the opportunity to the shareholders, this would not seem to have an adverse
effect on whether the opportunity was disclosed in accordance with § 5.05. The stat-
ute's purpose is to inform the shareholders that a corporate opportunity exists. Whether
this is done by the director who wishes to capitalize on the opportunity, or done by a
third party who has both knowledge and authority seems to make no difference. The
spirit of the statute is notice, and in either situation, notice is given.
96. Id. The statute is silent as to how much and what type of disclosure is needed
under § 5.05(a)(1). However, in light of the fact that Sol Schultz asked for the loan
"in return for the option to purchase the building," it would seem logical that the
shareholders knew the situation and also knew the consequences if the offer was re-
fused. Also, since this was a "closely held" corporation, it might be assumed that most
of those holding stock would be informed, not necessarily of the everyday workings of
the corporation, but at least of major problems concerning its stability.
97. Id.
98. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 79, § 5.05(a)(2).
99. Chemical Dynamics, 728 S.W.2d at 591.
100. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 79, § 5.05(a)(3).
101. It should be noted that even if the trier of fact concludes that the rejection
was not authorized or ratified by disinterested shareholders, § 5.05(a)(3)(A) may still
apply. This section asks whether the "rejection of the opportunity is fair to the corpora-
tion." In this sense, a defendant may sidestep the issue of whether the rejection was
authorized by the shareholders. He need only present to the court the question of
whether the rejection was "fair". Id. § 5.05(a)(3)(A).
102. Id. § 5.05(a)(3)(C).
103. Chemical Dynamics, 728 S.W.2d at 591. Although not on the record, it can
[Vol. 53
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sonally.104 The conclusion of this analysis shows that all three questions of the
ALI test were answered in the affirmative, absolving Newfeld from any
wrongdoing and allowing him to capitalize on the opportunity. As is shown,
the ALI test is much more simple than the confusing test used in Chemical
Dynamics, and much easier to apply.
CONCLUSION
The history of the corporate opportunity doctrine has been plagued with
vagueness and uncertainty. In search of a more suitable test, courts have cre-
ated, modified and combined to no satisfactory end. Not until the ALI test
had there been a corporate opportunity test which combines both the fairness
of the traditional tests with the certainty of application for which courts have
yearned. Although in Chemical Dynamics the facts were such as to not make
a difference in the ultimate outcome, one must look ahead to the future bene-
fits of a test which, in its application, has a more certain outcome.
JOHN E. JACKSON III
be assumed that the offer was also tendered to A. Y. Schultz, along with Sol Schultz
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